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Abstract 
BACKGROUND: Activation of D1 receptors has been related to successful goal-
directed behavior, but it remains unclear whether D1 receptor activation causally tips the 
balance of weighing costs and benefits in humans. Here, the impact of pharmacologically 
stimulated D1 receptors was tested on sensitivity to risk, delay, and effort costs in economic 
choice and asked whether D1 receptor stimulation would bias preferences toward options with 
increased costs in a cost-specific manner.  
METHODS: In a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, parallel-group phase 1 
study, 120 healthy young volunteers received either placebo or one of three doses (6 mg, 15 
mg, or 30 mg) of a novel, selective D1 agonist (PF-06412562). After drug administration, 
participants performed decision tasks measuring their preferences for risky, delayed, and 
effortful outcomes.  
RESULTS: Higher doses of the D1 agonist increased the willingness to exert physical 
effort for reward as well as reduced the preference for risky outcomes. We observed no effects 
on preferences for delayed rewards.  
CONCLUSIONS: The current results provide evidence that D1 receptor stimulation 
causally affects core aspects of cost-benefit decision making in humans. 
 
Key words: dopamine, D1 receptors, decision making, risk, temporal discounting, effort 
discounting 
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Introduction 
Economic choice often requires assessing and trading off benefits (rewards) and costs 
(1). Costs in economic choice come in various forms, including physical exertion required to 
obtain a benefit (effort), uncertainty in benefit delivery (risk), or waiting time for benefit 
delivery (delay). These costs lower the subjective value of benefits, thereby reducing the 
propensity of pursuing high-benefit, high-cost goals. Deficits in cost-benefit decision making 
belong to the core symptoms of several psychiatric disorders, including schizophrenia, 
addiction, or depression (2). It is thus important to understand neuropharmacological 
mechanisms that are causally involved in cost-benefit computations.  
The neurotransmitter dopamine, which acts on D1 receptor (D1R) and D2 receptor 
(D2R) families, has been ascribed a central role in integrating costs and benefits. Receptors of 
the D1 family reside predominantly in the direct “Go”-pathway, which links the striatum with 
the output regions of the basal ganglia and plays a crucial role in encoding reward outcomes 
(3). Moreover, D1Rs are also more prevalent than D2Rs in regions outside the basal ganglia, 
particularly prefrontal cortex (4). Stimulation of prefrontal D1Rs was linked to enhanced goal 
representations in working memory and lower susceptibility to distracting information (5-7). In 
contrast, a prefrontal D2-dominated state was associated with more flexible, but also less goal-
directed behavior. Both D1R activation in the striatal direct pathway and in the prefrontal cortex 
might increase reward sensitivity and thus improve the willingness to tolerate costs to achieve 
one’s goals. This is because a frontostriatal network is hypothesized to perform domain-general 
cost-benefit computations (8). In contrast, the finding of cost-specific neural mechanisms (1)  
would predict cost-specific effects of D1R activation. We therefore tested whether D1R over 
D2R activity differentially diminishes the subjective costs of (i) risk, (ii) time, and (iii) effort 
in human decision making.  
Up until recently, it had not been possible to achieve selective and prolonged stimulation 
of D1Rs in the human brain. Accordingly, dopaminergic involvement in human cost-benefit 
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weighting has primarily been shown for D2Rs, with higher or lower D2R activity increasing or 
reducing, respectively, subjective delay (9-12), risk (13-15), and effort (16) costs. Evidence in 
animal studies is mixed, as some studies related D1 activation to lower sensitivity to economic 
costs (17-20), while other studies reported higher sensitivity (21, 22). Some of these 
inconsistencies might be explained by a non-linear, e.g. inverted u-shaped, relationship between 
D1 activation and cost-benefit decision making (23), such that the impact of dopaminergic 
manipulations critically depends on baseline dopamine levels (24). This account predicts that 
D1R stimulation will increase willingness to tolerate costs in individuals with low baseline 
dopamine levels but decrease it in individuals with high baseline levels.  
Here, we used PF-06412562, a novel selective D1/D5 dopamine receptor partial agonist 
(25-27), to investigate the causal involvement of D1R stimulation in economic decision making 
(given that specific functions of D1 and D5 have not been elucidated yet, “D1R” here refers to 
both D1R and D5R). Specifically, this study tested the hypothesis that pharmacologically 
increasing D1R activity changes the willingness to tolerate risk, delay, and effort costs during 
cost-benefit decision making (Figure 1A). To assess the possibility that the impact of D1R 
stimulation depends on baseline dopaminergic activity (due to a non-linear relationship between 
D1 activity and cost-benefit decision making; Figure 1B), we tested whether the impact of D1R 
stimulation on decision making depends on baseline differences in working memory capacity 
(WMC). WMC is thought to approximate baseline dopamine synthesis capacity (28, 29). 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants  
The study protocol was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the canton of 
Zurich (2016-01693) and the Swiss agency for therapeutic products (2017DR1021). The study 
was carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, amendment of Fortaleza, Brazil, 
2013, and all pertinent guidelines and laws in force in Switzerland. The study was registered 
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on ClinicalTrials.gov (NCT03181841). A total of 147 volunteers who were recruited at the 
University of Zurich were screened for this study. In a screening session, volunteers underwent 
a thorough medical examination to assess their eligibility for the study. All participants gave 
written informed consent before the start of the screening examination. From this pool of 
screened volunteers, 120 participants (59 females, mean age = 22.57 years, range 18-28) were 
invited to participate in the study. For their participation, participants received 480 Swiss francs 
(CHF) and a monetary bonus depending on their choices (see below).  
 
Study design and procedures 
The current study was a monocentric, randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, 
and parallel-group clinical phase 1 trial. The 120 participants were randomly assigned to one 
of four experimental arms, one receiving placebo (lactose), and the other three arms a single 
dose (6 mg, 15 mg, or 30 mg) of the D1 agonist PF-06412562 in modified release form (for 
pre-clinical specificity analyses, see Supplementary methods).  
Participants completed three sessions (Figure 1A). In session 1 (duration = 1 h), they 
were screened for potential exclusion criteria including history of psychiatric or other chronic 
disorders and abnormalities in vital signs, electrocardiogram (ECG), blood and urine. All 
participants performed a urine drug test, female participants additionally a pregnancy test. As 
baseline measures, participants filled in questionnaires measuring reward sensitivity (BIS/BAS 
(30)), verbal intelligence (MWT-B (31)), and impulsivity (BIS-11 (32)). In addition, 
participants’ baseline time and risk preferences were measured (see below for details), as well 
as working memory performance using the digit span backward. The digit span backward 
represents a widely used measure for WMC, i.e. the maximum number of items that can be 
maintained and manipulated in working memory. For all of these baseline measures, we 
observed no significant group differences (Supplementary results and Table S3).  
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At the start of session 2 (7-21 days after session 1; duration = 9 h), pre-dose measures 
of vital signs and blood and urine samples were collected. Before substance intake, participants 
performed the digit span task backward. After the observed drug intake, participants stayed at 
the study site and were continuously monitored for potential side effects. Venous blood samples 
for the quantification of PF-06412562 and its metabolite PF-06663872 in plasma were 
withdrawn exactly 4 h and 8 h after drug intake. Together with the 8 h pharmacokinetics sample, 
post-dose measures of vital signs, blood and urine values and an ECG were also collected. Five 
hours after drug intake (close to expected maximum plasma concentrations of the modified 
release form), participants performed in balanced, pseudo-random order a computerized battery 
of tasks measuring: time preferences, risk preferences, effort preferences, reversal learning, 
Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer, and exploration/exploitation. The tasks were incentive 
compatible and participants knew beforehand that at the end of the experiment, one trial of each 
task would be selected randomly, implemented, and the corresponding payoffs be added to or 
subtracted from their payment. In this article, we report the results only of the three tasks 
measuring time, risk, and effort preferences, whereas data on the other tasks (measuring reward 
learning rather than economic preferences) will be reported separately. 
Finally, in session 3 (6-8 days after session 2; duration = 0.5 h), participants were again 
screened for side effects and for potential drug effects on ECG measures as well as blood and 
urine samples. We again assessed WMC. Moreover, we asked whether time and risk 
preferences returned to baseline. 
 
Behavioral assessments 
In the Risk preference task, participants made choices between two compound lotteries 
(e.g., lottery 1: a gain of 10 Swiss francs with 90% and a gain of 1 Swiss franc with 10% chance; 
lottery 2: a gain of 50 Swiss francs with 70% and a loss of 5 Swiss francs with 30% chance; 
Figure 2A). We used an adaptive task version (dynamic experiments for estimating preferences, 
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DEEP (33)) that allows estimating a participant’s risk attitude (defined by the prospect theory 
parameters value curvature σ, probability distortion α, and loss aversion λ) with a relatively low 
number of trials (see Supplementary materials). 
In the time preference task, participants made choices between smaller-sooner (SS; e.g., 
10 Swiss francs today) and larger-later (LL; e.g., 16 Swiss francs in 90 days) rewards (Figure 
3A). In the task version applied in session 2, we administered all combinations of SS (0-16 
Swiss francs today) and LL reward options (16 Swiss francs delivered after delays of 1-180 
days) (34). For the baseline measures in session 1 and 3, a quicker, dynamic time preference 
task was used in a similar way as for the risk preference task (33) (see Supplementary materials).  
In the effort preference task, participants could obtain a monetary bonus by exerting 
physical effort (squeezing a handgrip for 20 s with 40%-100% of their maximum grip force; 
Figure 4A) (35). On each trial, participants made choices between effort-free (1 Swiss franc for 
0% physical effort) and effortful (1.5-5 Swiss francs for 40-100% physical effort) reward 
options (Figure 4B). To avoid fatigue and increase similarity of implementation with the risk 
and time preference tasks, participants did not have to exert the effort immediately after having 
accepted an offer but only for one randomly selected choice at the end of the experimental 
session (see Supplementary methods).  
 
Data Analysis 
The statistical analysis of the behavioral data was performed with Matlab R2016b 
(MathWorks, Natick, MA) and IBM SPSS Statistics 22. For the model-free analyses of risk, 
time, and effort preferences, we used mixed generalized linear models as implemented in SPSS 
(for details, see Supplementary methods). The alpha threshold was set to 5% (two-tailed) for 
all analyses.  
To account for non-linear (i.e., baseline-dependent) relationships between dopamine 
and decision making, we used WMC as proxy for baseline dopaminergic activity (28, 36, 37), 
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because WMC was found to (linearly) relate to dopaminergic synthesis capacity (29). Samples 
were therefore split into a low WMC (median and below; i.e., 6 or less correct responses) and 
a high WMC group (above median; i.e., 7 or more correct responses) based on digit span 
backward performance in session 2. We used WMC as binary, rather than continuous, predictor 
because 23% of all participants reached the maximum performance level in the digit span 
backward task. Thus, a continuous measure of WMC would have mis-represented individual 
differences in high WMC. For one participant no digit span data were available for session 2. 
This participant was assigned to the low WMC group based on the session 1 digit span data. 
Using mixed generalized linear models (MGLMs) as implemented in SPSS, we modelled the 
linear effects of Absolute dose (placebo, 6 mg, 15 mg, 30 mg), and WMC group for all analyses. 
Importantly, the Absolute dose × WMC interaction assessed potential baseline-dependent 
effects of the D1 agonist. In addition to modelling drug effects by Absolute dose, all analyses 
were also conducted with Relative dose (absolute dose divided by individual body weight in 
kg) and Plasma concentration (mean of pharmacokinetic samples for PF-06412562 4h and 8h 
after drug administration; Table S2) as individualized measures of drug dose.  
 
Results 
Baseline-dependent effects of D1R stimulation on risk preferences 
In the risk preference task (Figure 2A), we tested whether the D1 agonist modulated the 
impact of expected value or risk on decisions under risk in the main experimental session. We 
regressed choices of the high risk lottery (which was, by design, in most cases also the lottery 
with the higher expected value) on predictors for the WMC group, Absolute dose, differences 
in expected value (EVdiff) and in risk (Riskdiff) between the high and low risk lotteries, as well 
as the interactions between these factors. Increasing differences in expected value increased the 
probability of choosing the high risk option, beta = 1.08, t(7184) = 5.27, p < 0.001, whereas 
D1 receptors and economic preferences 9 
 
increasing differences in risk reduced it, beta = -0.20, t(7184) = 2.15, p = 0.03 in line with value-
seeking and risk averse decision making.  
With regard to drug effects, we observed a main effect of absolute dose, beta = -0.014, 
t(7184) = 2.08, p = 0.04, suggesting a lower preference for high risk lotteries (more risk 
aversion) with increasing doses. This effect was specified by interactions with EVdiff, beta = -
0.029, t(7184) = 2.48, p = 0.01, and Riskdiff, beta = 0.011, t(7184) = 2.01, p = 0.04. As illustrated 
in Figure 2B/C, higher doses increased risk aversion particularly at higher expected value and 
lower risk differences between lotteries. The MGLM also yielded significant EVdiff × Riskdiff, 
beta = -0.57, t(7184) = 3.86, p < 0.001, as well as Absolute dose × EVdiff × Riskdiff interactions, 
beta = 0.020, t(7184) = 2.44, p = 0.01, further corroborating that D1R stimulation reduced the 
willingness to take the riskier option the larger the difference in expected value and the smaller 
the difference in risk between lotteries. There was no evidence that drug effects were modulated 
by WMC, all t(7188) < 1, all p > 0.36. We note that the results were robust to modelling drug 
effects as Relative dose, all t(7188) > 3.06, all p < 0.002, or Plasma concentration, all t(7188) 
> 2.70, all p < 0.007. The model-free findings converge with a model-based analysis suggesting 
that stronger D1 receptor stimulation non-significantly increases risk (and loss) aversion as 
measured by prospect theory parameters, albeit in a baseline-dependent fashion (see 
Supplementary results). Together, these findings suggest that D1 receptors causally contribute 
to determining the subjective value of risky outcomes during decisions under risk. 
 
No evidence for effects of D1R stimulation on time preferences 
Next, we assessed whether the D1 agonist affected the willingness to tolerate delay costs 
in intertemporal choice (Figure 3A). We analyzed intertemporal choices by regressing dummy-
coded choices (delayed vs. immediate reward option) on predictors for WMC, Absolute dose, 
Delay, SS reward magnitude, and the interaction terms. As expected, the probability of 
choosing delayed rewards decreased with increasing Delay, beta = -1.68, t(6464) = 8.23, p < 
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0.001, as well as with increasing amount of the SS reward option, beta = -3.59, t(6464) = 15.48, 
p < 0.001. Under placebo, participants were more patient in the high compared with the low 
WMC group, beta = 1.08, t(6464) = 2.42, p = 0.02. Importantly, however, this analysis revealed 
no significant main or interaction effects including the factor Absolute dose, all t(6464) < 1.13, 
all p > 0.14 (Figure 3B-C). Again, this null result also held when we replaced Absolute dose by 
Relative dose, all t(6464) < 1.29, p > 0.19, or Plasma concentration, all t(6464) < 1.36, all p > 
0.17. Also a model-based analysis of time preferences yielded no significant drug effects (see 
Supplementary results). Thus, contrary to our prediction, no significant effects of D1R 
stimulation were observed on time preferences. 
 
D1R stimulation enhances willingness to engage in rewarded effort 
Finally, we tested whether D1R stimulation causally contributes to tolerating effort costs 
for rewards in the effort preference task (Figure 4A-B). We regressed dummy-coded choices of 
the effortful reward option on predictors for Absolute dose, Effort, Reward magnitude, WMC, 
and the interactions between these factors. The resulting significant effects of Effort, beta = -
3.73, t(9584) = 10.71, p < 0.001, and of Reward magnitude, beta = 2.23, t(9584) = 7.94, p < 
0.001, indicate that the preference for the effortful reward option decreased with increasing 
effort requirements and decreasing reward magnitudes on offer. The impact of Absolute dose 
on choice did not interact with effort level or reward magnitude, all t(9584) < 1.34, all p > 0.18 
(Figure 4C). Importantly, however, when drug effects were modelled as Relative dose or 
Plasma concentration (which capture individual drug exposure more realistically than Absolute 
dose), the impact of effort level on choices interacted with both Relative dose, beta = 2.63, 
t(9584) = 1.97, p = 0.041, and Plasma concentration, beta = 0.05, t(9584) = 1.97, p = 0.049. 
These findings suggest that effort discounting was weaker as the individualized concentrations 
of the D1 agonist increased. No significant interactions were observed between drug effects and 
WMC or Reward magnitude, all t(9584) < 1.58, all p > 0.11. These model-free findings were 
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corroborated by a model-based analysis showing that higher D1 agonist doses reduced effort 
discounting using the best-fitting linear discount model. Specifically, the model-based analysis 
revealed significant drug effects on effort discounting both for Absolute and Relative dose, 
while the impact of Plasma concentration was marginally significant (SI Results). In sum, these 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that D1R activation reduces the discounting of 
subjective reward value with increasing effort costs. 
 
Discussion 
To elucidate the role of D1Rs for human economic decision making, our study used a 
novel, selective agonist. We find (to the best of our knowledge for the first time) that 
pharmacologically increasing D1R activation modulates the sensitivity to risk and effort costs 
in human economic choice.  
For effort costs, increasing D1 agonist doses reduced the discounting of monetary 
rewards with increasing effort when employing individualized measures of drug exposure 
(relative dose and plasma concentration). This finding is in line with animal studies relating D1 
activation to enhanced willingness to exert physical effort for rewards (20, 38, 39). 
Anatomically, the motivation to engage in rewarded effort is associated with activation in 
dopaminoceptive regions such as the striatum and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (40-43). The 
D1 agonist might have reduced effort discounting by influencing activation involved in trading 
off rewards against the required effort costs. The effect was not modulated by individual 
differences in baseline WMC, in line with a robust relation between D1R activation and 
motivation. 
With regard to risk preferences, increasing D1 agonist doses lowered preferences for 
riskier lotteries with higher expected values, suggesting increased risk aversion under strong 
D1R activation. Also the analysis of prospect theory parameters revealed weak, trend-level 
effects of D1R stimulation on risk (and loss) aversion, which however tended to depend on 
D1 receptors and economic preferences 12 
 
baseline differences in WMC. These findings are consistent with animal studies reporting a 
causal link between D1R activation and risky decisions (18, 19). They also mirror findings in 
humans for which blocking D2R reduced risk aversion (13). The finding that increased D1R 
stimulation reduces risk aversion in high WMC individuals informs a recent theoretical model 
of risky decision making (44), which links D1-dominated states of striatal dopamine to reduced 
risk aversion. In contrast to the model predictions, we observed a lower preference for risky 
lotteries in the group with the highest D1 agonist dose. However, when assuming an inverted 
u-shaped relationship between D1R activation and decision making, one might reconcile our 
data with the theoretical model by arguing that only low levels of striatal D1R activation reduce 
risk aversion whereas high levels (as in the highest dose group) increase it.  
At variance with our hypothesis, no significant effects of D1R stimulation on time 
preferences were observed. This may appear surprising, given that preference for delayed 
rewards is canonically related to prefrontal cortex activity (45, 46), which in theory should be 
influenced by the D1 agonist. We cannot rule out the possibility that lower or higher doses of 
the D1 agonist than the ones we administered might have shown an impact on time preferences. 
Still, it is interesting to note that also in the animal literature there is no clear link between D1R 
activation and time preferences: enhancing D1 activation was found to either reduce impulsivity 
(17), increase impulsivity (21, 22), or have no impact on time preferences at all (47). It is 
conceivable that potential drug effects on striatal activation (which may be more strongly 
associated with preferences for immediate rather than delayed outcomes (45)) might have 
counteracted the drug effects on prefrontal activation. Following on from this notion, future 
research on time preferences may want to disentangle the contributions of D1Rs in the 
mesocortical system from those in the nigrostriatal system.  
Together, the current data provide important insights into the causal function of D1R 
activation for value-based decision making. D1Rs are mainly expressed in two pathways, the 
mesocortical pathway (where D1 dominated states lead to stable goal representations (5, 6)) 
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and the nigrostriatal direct “go”-pathway (which is involved in encoding reward outcomes (3)). 
Activation in both pathways might change a decision maker’s sensitivity to goals or rewards at 
stake. For example, by enhancing prefrontal goal representations, D1R activation might 
strengthen the focus on benefits (assuming the goal of maximizing benefits), which in turn 
motivates humans to tolerate larger costs. Alternatively, a recent computational model of striatal 
dopamine predicts that high dopamine levels increase the preference for options with the 
highest gain independently of the associated action costs (48). Theories about both prefrontal 
and striatal dopamine are thus consistent with our findings that the administered D1 agonist 
modulated the sensitivity to risk and physical effort. While in humans the causal contribution 
of D1R activation was mainly demonstrated for working memory functioning (49), the current 
work shows that D1Rs are causally involved in economic choice as well. 
Our findings speak to the clinical literature. Patients with schizophrenia (50) or 
Parkinson’s disease (51) show increased effort discounting. It would be interesting to see 
whether these deficits can be counteracted with D1R activation. Deficits in trading-off risks 
against benefits were described for bipolar disorder (52) and schizophrenia (53). However, our 
findings also suggest that dopaminergic treatments of psychiatric disorders should consider 
baseline dopamine levels in order to avoid side effects of overdosing on decision making. In 
Parkinson’s disease, treatment with D3 and D2 agonists is associated with impulse control 
disorders including increased risk taking and excessive gambling (54, 55). Such undesired side 
effects could be minimized by adjusting therapy according to the relationship between risk 
taking and baseline levels as suggested by the current data. 
Dopaminergic activity and economic preferences were hypothesized to follow a non-
linear, e.g. inverted u-shaped, relationship (23). This assumption might allow reconciling our 
finding of increased risk aversion under strong D1R activation with theoretical claims linking 
D1-dominated states to lower risk aversion (44). Also the (trend-level) baseline-dependency of 
drug effects on prospect theory parameters is consistent with such an inverted u-shaped function 
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between dopamine and risk preferences. It is also worth noting that increasing D1R stimulation 
reduced cost tolerance in risky decision making but increased it in effort-based choice. This 
supports the assumption that the relationship between D1R activation and various aspects of 
cognition follows a variety of functions with different optimal dopamine levels (23). However, 
with the range of doses used here, no strong conclusions can be drawn regarding the precise 
shape of the functions between D1R activation and economic preferences. 
Some limitations of the study need to be mentioned. First, it should be noted that the 
present pharmacological manipulation is systemic. The D1 agonist acts both in prefrontal 
cortex, where it might impact decision-relevant cognitive processes, and other regions 
containing D1Rs such as the striatum, where the D1 agonist might affect motivational rather 
than cognitive processes. Thus, while the result pattern is consistent with theories about 
prefrontal dopamine, changes in dopaminergic activity in other brain regions, particularly the 
nigrostriatal direct pathway, might have contributed to the observed effects as well. In fact, the 
lack of significant results in the time preference task might be explained by the opposing roles 
of prefrontal cortex and striatum in intertemporal decisions. Related to the lack of anatomical 
specificity, the current results are also agnostic with regard to which cognitive (e.g., working 
memory functioning) processes might mediate the observed drug effects on decision making. 
It should be noted, though, that under placebo we observed no impact of WMC group on risk 
or effort preferences, which is at variance with the assumption that drug effects on working 
memory functioning mediate the effects on risk or effort preferences. Second, baseline synthesis 
capacity was measured only indirectly via working memory functioning. A direct measurement 
of baseline dopamine levels would have required the use of positron emission tomography 
(PET) imaging. However, previous studies provided evidence both for the reliability of WMC 
as proxy for dopamine synthesis capacity (29), and for dependency of pharmacological 
dopamine manipulations on individual baseline WMC (36, 37). Third, this was a single dose 
study, and the effects may have been more pronounced if repeated doses had been used. 
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To conclude, our data provide first evidence in humans that D1R activation causally 
shapes economic preferences. Stimulating D1Rs with a selective D1 agonist modulated risk and 
effort discounting while leaving time preferences unchanged. Our results converge with 
theoretical accounts assuming that D1 dominated states strengthen goal-related activation in 
prefrontal cortex and with a role of dopamine for economic choice. 
 
  







Figures S1-S3  
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Figure 1. (A) Study overview. In a baseline screening session (session 1), volunteers were 
tested for study eligibility and performed baseline measures for risk and time preferences. In 
the main experimental session (session 2), participants received placebo or one of three doses 
of the D1 agonist PF-06412562. Five hours after drug intake, they performed tasks that assessed 
risk, time, and effort preferences and thereby allowed us to measure the impact of the drug on 
the willingness to tolerate costs for larger benefits. Finally, in a post-screening session (session 
3), participants were checked for potential side effects and performed tests for risk and time 
preferences. (B) The relationship between cost-benefit decision making and prefrontal 
dopaminergic activity is thought to follow a non-linear (e.g., inverted u-shaped) function. The 
impact of the D1 agonist on economic preferences might therefore depend on baseline 
differences in working memory capacity as proxy for dopamine synthesis capacity.  
 
Figure 2. (A) In the risk preference task, participants made choices between two lotteries (e.g., 
“10 Swiss francs with 90% or 1 Swiss franc with 10%” versus “50 Swiss francs with 70% or -
5 Swiss francs with 30%”).  (B, C) Mean logistic curves indicating the probability of choosing 
the riskier, higher expected value option as function of difference in (B) expected value and (C) 
risk between the lottery options. Increasing doses of the D1 agonist (particularly in the 30 mg 
group) reduced the preference for the high risk lottery option predominantly if this option was 
associated with (B) a higher expected value or (C) an only marginally increased risk compared 
with the low risk lottery. 
 
Figure 3. (A) In the time preference task, participants made choices between smaller sooner 
(e.g., 10 Swiss francs today) and larger later (e.g., 16 Swiss francs in 90 days) rewards. (B) We 
observed no significant drug effects on the impact of delay on time preferences. 
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Figure 4. (A) In the effort preference task, we used a grip force dynamometer to vary effort 
requirements. (B) Participants chose between a smaller reward (1 Swiss franc) requiring no 
effort and a larger reward (1.5-5 Swiss francs) requiring effort (squeezing with 40-100% of 
their maximum force for 20s). (C) Mean logistic curves indicating the probability of choosing 
the effortful reward option as function of effort level. While effort discounting was steepest in 
the placebo group, increasing doses of the D1 agonist (when measured as relative dose or 
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